The causal induction from the theory of causal power of Cheng

Authors

  • Miguel E. Uribe Konrad Lorenz Fundación Universitaria. Bogota (Colombia)
  • Lina Agudelo Konrad Lorenz Fundación Universitaria. Bogota (Colombia)
  • Miguel Hernández Konrad Lorenz Fundación Universitaria. Bogota (Colombia)

Keywords:

Causal reasoning; theory of causal power

Abstract

One of the central theories within the explanation of the causal induction (i.e. , the inference process that allows the people identify causes in the everyday life) is the Theory of Causal Power that Patricia Cheng development in 1997 and that has been advocating since that time (Cheng, 1997; Holyoak & Cheng, 2011). This theory seeks to overcome the traditional mecha-nism models and simple models of co that until the time they were considered as an explanation of the process of causal induction. However the complexity of the mathematical model that sustains them has done little accessible to the non-specialized community that may be of interest in this field. The purpose of this article is, then, make an introduction to the Theory of Causal Power that shows not only its ex-planatory advantages compared to other models, but a simple reconstruction of the mathematical model that underpins it.

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Published

2014-04-04

How to Cite

Uribe, M. E., Agudelo, L., & Hernández, M. (2014). The causal induction from the theory of causal power of Cheng. CULTURA EDUCACIÓN Y SOCIEDAD, 5(1). Retrieved from https://ojstest.certika.co/culturaeducacionysociedad/article/view/999