Rational choices ¿utopia?

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17981/econcuc.39.2.2018.09

Keywords:

rationality, entropy, elections, salience

Abstract

Individuals are constantly making decisions, which in many cases can present coordination and information failures. It is important to ask whether individuals always present that optimal and maximizing behavior in their decisions, characteristic aspects of the theory of rationality. The objective of this article is to determine, from authors such as McFadden, Woodford, Kahneman, Sims, whether individuals still make decisions based on rationality, or on the contrary, if rationality today is considered as a utopia. To determine this, an exploratory qualitative analysis was made of the main theories that have been developed in this field in recent years. Among the results, it is worth mentioning that despite the fact that much progress has been made in formulating models that better explain the agents' decisions, it is clear that this has not been enough. McFadden's Theory of Prospective can not generate economic implications, because the individuals who make arbitrary decisions are limited in the markets. While in the theory of Random Attention developed by Sims and adopted by Woodford, individuals have finite capacity for information processing.

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Author Biographies

Oscar Hernan Cerquera Losada, Universidad Surcolombiana

Economist of the Universidad Surcolombiana. Master in Economics from the Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina. Full time professor and head of the Economics program and member of the IGUAQUE research group

Camilo Fabiam Gomez Segura, Universidad Surcolombiana

Economist of the Universidad Surcolombiana. Master in Economics from the Universidad Nacional de la Plata, Argentina. Teacher full time of Economics

Cristian Felipe Orjuela Yacue, Universidad Surcolombiana

Economist of the Universidad Surcolombiana. Master in Economics from the Universidad Nacional de la Plata, Argentina. Full time professor and head of the Economics program and member of the IGUAQUE research group

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Published

2018-11-23

How to Cite

Cerquera Losada, O. H., Gomez Segura, C. F., & Orjuela Yacue, C. F. (2018). Rational choices ¿utopia?. ECONÓMICAS CUC, 39(2), 145–158. https://doi.org/10.17981/econcuc.39.2.2018.09

Issue

Vol. 39 No. 2 (2018)

Section

Articles: Administration, Organization and Methods

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